The Market Has Spoken, and It Is Rigged
By SIMON JOHNSON
Simon Johnson is the Ronald A. Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship at
the M.I.T. Sloan School of Management and co-author of "White House
Burning: The Founding Fathers, Our National Debt, and Why It Matters
to You."
In the aftermath of the Barclays rate-fixing scandal, the most
surprising reaction has been from people in the financial sector who
fully understand the awfulness of what has happened. Rather than
seeing this as an issue of law and order, some well-informed people
have been drawn toward arguments that excuse or justify the behavior
of the Barclays employees.
This is a big mistake, in terms of the economics at stake and the
likely political impact.
The behavior at Barclays has all the hallmarks of fraud - intentional
deception for personal gain, causing significant damage to others.
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission nailed the detailed mechanics
of this deception in plain English in its Order Instituting
Proceedings (which is also a settlement and series of admissions by
Barclays). Most of the compelling quotes from traders involved in this
scandal come from the commission's order, but too few commentators
seem to have read the full document. Please look at it now, if you
have not done so already.
The commission's order portrays a wide-ranging conspiracy (or perhaps
a set of conspiracies) to rig markets, including, but not limited to,
any securities for which the price is linked to a particular set of
short-term interest rates.
The collective term for these rates is the London Interbank Offered
Rate, known as Libor, but the use of this nomenclature sometimes hides
the fact that there is a separate Libor daily for each of 10
currencies at 15 maturities, from overnight to 12 months, according to
the British Bankers Association. The notional size of the derivatives
involved is on the order of $360 trillion.
Barclays could not have manipulated those rates by themselves - and
that is not what the C.F.T.C. found or the basis of the Barclays
settlement. Rather, some Barclays employees colluded with people at
other banks in a way that, over a period of years, moved Libor rates
up and down, depending on what would favor the trading positions of
the people and organizations involved.
Each Libor "panel" of banks involves seven to 18 banks. Participating
banks submit the rate at which they can supposedly borrow at a
particular maturity and in a specified currency, and an average is
calculated (taking out high and low values). No one bank is likely to
be able to move the calculated Libor rates by itself.
Once the global financial crisis began to bite, there appears to have
been a more systematic manipulation of Libor reporting by Barclays
management in a particular direction - downward, to make it seem that
the bank was healthier and therefore able to borrow from other banks
at a cheaper rate.
George Osborne, Britain's chancellor of the Exchequer (the equivalent
position to the secretary of the Treasury) and a Conservative Party
member, said recently, "Fraud is a crime in ordinary business; why
shouldn't it be so in banking?" The answer, of course, is that fraud
is not allowed in any well-run country.
Anyone who takes personal responsibility seriously should want all
those involved to be held accountable - to the full extent of the law
in all jurisdictions. Anything that lets individuals escape
consequences will further undermine the legitimacy that underpins all
markets. Bankers should be leading the charge to clean up their
industry.
Nevertheless, five arguments put forward in the last 10 days, singly
or collectively, attempt to provide some sort of cover for what
happened at Barclays. None of these arguments have any merit.
First, it is argued that this kind of cheating around Libor has been
going on for a long time. This may be true, but it is a sad and lame
excuse that is unlikely to get anyone off. The bigger question must
be: Is the financial sector crooked at its core? Statements about a
pattern of behavior only strengthen the case that incentives, culture
and organizations are all badly broken at the heart of the world's
financial system.
Second, it is also asserted that "everyone does it." This is not any
kind of defense - try it next time you are accused of fraud. But the
perception that many people could be involved is part of the reason
why this scandal has legs. A broad range of involvement across the
financial sector is consistent with what is in the C.F.T.C. order -
although the full scope of the conspiracies has not yet been made
clear.
There are three United States banks involved in Libor panels: JPMorgan
Chase, Bank of America and Citigroup. Are they also implicated in some
aspect of rigging interest rates and therefore securities prices?
Barclays was the first to settle with the C.F.T.C., presumably
enabling investigators to gain better access to information about who
else is involved. It would not be a surprise if bigger fish are still
to come.
Third, Libor-rigging is defended as a "victimless crime." This is
untrue. Traders at Barclays and other banks gained from this series of
manipulations, so someone else lost. That may have been investors, who
received lower returns than they would have otherwise. Or it may have
been borrowers, who paid higher interest rate and related costs than
would have been necessary in an honest market. Other losers are
presumably everyone who was effectively overcharged by all the
intermediaries involved in crooked behavior. Some local governments
have also lost heavily, at a time when these losses put pressure on
essential services and will tend to increase taxes.
Honest people in the financial sector should be up in arms about the
behavior of Barclays and other megabanks.
Fourth, some contend that it is the regulators' responsibility and
fault that there was cheating on Libor. It is certainly the case that
there was regulatory capture at work -- that is, officials in Britain,
the United States and perhaps elsewhere should have been paying closer
attention. I made exactly this point on National Public Radio's "All
Things Considered" last Saturday.
The mystique of the financial sector wowed many people - including
many prominent policy intellectuals, Democratic and Republican - in
the years before 2008. But who does the capturing in regulatory
capture? Big banks work long and hard and lobby at many levels to push
regulators toward paying less attention.
Fifth, the weakest argument is, "It was only a few basis points, here
and there" (where a basis point is a hundredth of a percentage point,
i.e., 0.01 percent). Either the Libor reporting process and,
consequently, the pricing of derivatives has been corrupted by a
criminal conspiracy, or it has not. There is no "just a little" in
this context for the enormous global securities market.
Robert E. Diamond Jr., who resigned last week as chief executive of
Barclays, reportedly said, "On the majority of days, no requests were
made at all" to cheat on Libor. The Economist, which does not make a
general habit of criticizing prominent people in the financial sector,
observed, "This was rather like an adulterer saying that he was
faithful on most days."
Mr. Diamond has fallen. Who is next? How will this play in American
politics? There is still time for politicians on the right and on the
left of the political spectrum to get ahead of the issue. Digging in
around specious arguments in favor of price-fixing cartels is not the
way to go.
Power corrupts, and financial market power has completely corrupted
financial markets. Barclays and the other global megabanks involved in
fixing Libor have brought their own industry very low - completely
destroying the legitimacy on which sensible financial intermediation
needs to be based.
Who trusts a banker at this point? The collateral damage is enormous.
Who in their right mind would buy a complex derivative product from
Barclays or anyone else implicated in this growing scandal?
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